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Abstract
We study non-contractible ¯rms' investment in general training in a model of fric-
tional unemployment. Since training is vested in workers, ¯rms' return to training
is zero when a match ends. Consensual layo® provisions or large severance pay-
ments oblige ¯rms to bargain e±ciently over the joint payo® from separation. This
increases employers' incentives to train as they share workers' outside return to gen-
eral human capital. The result generalizes to all types of general investment that
are vested in the non-investing party on separation.
We also show that, independently from underinvestment in training, the laissez-
faire equilibrium is always ine±cient for any given level of investment.
JEL classi¯cation: J24, J63, J65.
Keywords: Consensual layo®s, general training, matching.
¤E-mail: G.Fella@qmw.ac.uk. Homepage: http://www.qmw.ac.uk/~ugte176
11 Introduction
The traditional theory of human capital as pioneered by Becker (1964) predicts that in
a competitive labour market workers should bear the full cost of and capture the entire
return to general training. In such an environment investment in general training is fully
e±cient, barring borrowing constraints. Yet, there is substantial evidence that ¯rms share
both costs and proceeds of general training. For instance, Harho® and Kane (1994) doc-
ument how German ¯rms bear a substantial part of the cost of apprenticeship training
despite that apprenticeship programmes are highly standardized and provide mostly gen-
eral skills. For the US Barron, Berger and Black (1997) ¯nd that productivity growth
associated with training exceeds ten times wage growth, even though most of this training
is deemed general by the ¯rms providing it1. Furthermore, there is a widespread consensus
epitomized by Lucas (1987, p.53) that the Walrasian framework cannot capture crucial
aspects of labour markets and that search frictions are crucial to explain unemployment.
Investment in general training is lower than socially optimal when costly search implies
deviations from the benchmark competitive paradigm. Search costs drive a wedge between
the return to a (pro¯table) match and the return to seeking another partner. They thus
generate a quasi-rent to continuing employment. In the absence of contracts then, bilateral
bargaining determines the division of the joint surplus. This gives ¯rms an incentive to
invest in general training as long as they capture a positive fraction of the total surplus.
On the other hand, the level of investment is ine±ciently low as both ¯rms and workers
capture only part of the return. This is the standard hold up problem of Williamson
(1985).
There are two facets to hold up. First, even if complete contracting between the
current employer and the worker is possible at the time of investment, part of the return
to general training will be held up by future employers if there is a positive probability
of separation. Since the future employer is unknown at the time of investment the ¯rst
best can never be achieved, as argued in Acemoglu (1997). Second, in the absence of
contracts, investment is held up also by the current partner further depressing incentives,
as shown in Grout (1984).
1Bishop (1996) provides extensive references to the empirical evidence on the issue.
2Various simple and less simple contractual solutions to this second kind of spillover
have been suggested. The existing literature, though, has concentrated on investment in
assets that are either speci¯c to the relationship or general, but of the \sel¯sh investment"
type. A general sel¯sh investment is one that increases the investing party's bene¯t from
trade both inside and outside the relationship (e.g. physical capital). General training
does not fall in either of the above categories. It increases ¯rm's revenues, but it is vested
in the worker in case of separation.
This paper analyses non-contractible investment in general human capital in an equi-
librium search model. It takes as a stylized fact ¯rms' investment in general training
and assumes that bargaining takes place according to a variant of Rubinstein's (1982)
strategic bargaining model. Returns are determined by relative bargaining power if they
exceed outside market opportunities, but are constrained by the binding outside return
otherwise. We show that institutions that allow ¯rms to terminate the employment re-
lationship only with workers' consent, or that, in general, limit employers' ability to lay
workers o®, improve ¯rms' incentives to invest in general training. The intuition is the
following. Since human capital is vested in the worker, a ¯rm's return in case of sepa-
ration is independent from its investment in the current worker. So, its marginal return
to training is zero in those states of nature in which its outside market opportunity is
binding whether the match is severed or not. Nonetheless, as general training increases
a worker's productivity also with other employers, the worker does capture part of the
return in case of separation2. Consensual layo® arrangements prevent a ¯rm from uni-
laterally terminating the employment relationship and oblige employers to bargain over
the size of the payment - equivalently the share of the total payo® from separation - that
induces workers to accept severance. By forcing ¯rms and workers to share the return
to training in all states of nature in which workers do not quit voluntarily, consensual
layo®s improve employers' incentives to train. For the same reason, these arrangements
also boost workers' incentives to carry out costly general investment which is vested in
the ¯rm. Examples of these investments are workers' e®ort to ensure product quality and
the development of products that remain the intellectual property of the ¯rm.
2In case of separation, the remaining part of the return is reaped by the future employer as argued by
Acemoglu (1997).
3Interestingly, there exist real world institutions that resemble the kind of optimal ar-
rangements highlighted in this paper. In Germany, ¯rms cannot legally carry out mass
redundancies unless they have agreed with workers' representatives on a social plan cover-
ing procedures and compensation packages. Some US ¯rms such as DEC, IBM, Eli Lilly
contractually commit to a zero-¯ring policy that e®ectively prevents them from laying
o® workers unless by mutual consent. The institution of lifetime employment in Japan
has the same e®ects. Legislated severance payments and other job security measures may
achieve some or all of the e±ciency gains associated with consensual layo®s depending on
their size. Large enough statutory dismissal costs e®ectively prevent ¯rms from unilat-
erally terminating the employment relationship. Yet, whenever separation is e±cient the
parties will bargain e±ciently on a lower voluntary severance payment which induces the
worker to agree on termination. Though, job security is often blamed for distorting the
allocation of workers across ¯rms, this paper shows that not only this cannot be if wages
are °exible, but that dismissal restrictions may actually induce both ¯rms and workers
to invest more in activities that bene¯t each other.
We also discuss the e±ciency properties of the decentralized equilibrium we charac-
terize. Independently from underinvestment in training, the laissez-faire equilibrium is
always ine±cient for any given level of investment. Hosios (1990) has shown that the
right value of the Nash bargaining parameter can decentralize the social optimum in
search models with homogeneous agents. In our environment, workers are heterogeneous
along the job creation and the job destruction margins. While a ¯rm can match with a
trained or an untrained worker, all separation release a skilled employee. For this reason
the sharing parameter alone cannot ensure e±ciency on both margins.
This paper is related to a number of contributions in the literature. As in the literature
surveyed in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) it takes market imperfections as the reason why
¯rms invest in general training. As in the incomplete contract literature it emphasizes
contractual incompleteness within the current match as a source of underinvestment. Our
result exploits the insight of Hart and Moore (1988) and further explored by MacLeod and
Malcomson (1993), Che and Chung (1996) and Che and Hausch (1999). In all these papers
breach remedies can restore e±ciency under certain conditions. As noted above, though,
these articles all restrict attention to investment which is either speci¯c, or general but
4vested in the investor. On the other hand, the kind of investment we consider is general
but vested in the non-investing party. The type of breach remedy proposed in the above
articles is an unconditional tax on separation. Unlike the consensual layo®s arrangements
discussed here, when investment is general and vested in the non-investing party such a
tax would never allow the investor to capture a share of the return in case of separation.
The idea that dismissal costs can increase ¯rms' incentive to invest in general training
in the presence of labour market frictions has previously been explored by Jansen (1997).
Her result exploits a mechanism quite di®erent from the one used in the above mentioned
articles and the present paper. She shows that, under the assumption that dismissal
costs work as an unconditional tax on separation and that job destruction rates (assumed
exogenous) are lower for skilled workers, ¯ring costs may increase ¯rms' incentives to
invest in general training for certain parameter con¯gurations. The intuition is that,
since dismissal costs cannot be bargained away, ¯rms can reduce the probability of paying
them by training their workers. The e®ect is reversed, though, if the separation rate is
the same for both trained and untrained workers. Our result is instead unambiguous
and does not require either assumption. In fact we show that in equilibrium a higher
level of general training does not necessarily imply a lower separation rate, as workers'
productivity increases both inside and outside the match.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 analyses
the equilibrium and discusses the empirical predictions. Section 4 derives conditions
for steady-state e±ciency and discusses the sources of ine±ciency in the laissez-faire
equilibrium. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Economic environment
Time is discrete. We adopt the notational convention x = x(t) and x0 = x(t+1) to denote
the value of a variable x at the beginning of period t and t+1 respectively. Agents are risk-
neutral and discount the future at the constant rate r: The total labour force is constant
and there is a potentially unlimited supply of productive units. At the beginning of each
5period there are u searching unemployed workers and v ¯rms with an open vacancy.
Production requires a ¯xed quantity of physical capital which has to be in place before
the ¯rm starts searching for a partner. The cost of the investment is · and can be fully
recovered in case of separation. Alternatively, one could think of · as a one-o® cost to
the ¯rm of entering the labour market. As shown in Fella (1999), what is crucial for the
result in this paper and for any e®ect of ¯ring costs in a bargaining framework is that
the ¯rm's return to ¯ring a worker is positive in the absence of employment protection
legislation.
Because of uncertainty about the location of potential partners' agents have to search
for one. Finding a match takes at least one period. Search frictions are modelled accord-
ing to a constant returns to scale, strictly concave, matching technology. So, matching
probabilities depend only on market tightness µ = v=u: q(µ) and p(µ) = µq(µ) are respec-
tively the proportion of ¯rms and workers who ¯nd a match by the end of the period.
Both are restricted to lie in the unit interval.
The timing of events for a matched pair is illustrated in ¯gure 1. At the end of period
t a partner has been found. Before the quality of the match is discovered - at time t:1
- the parties can negotiate side-payments3. If the worker is untrained the ¯rm trains
her at time t:2. Training is fully general and takes place at a constant marginal cost
normalized to one. Investment is instantaneous and third parties cannot verify neither
its level nor the productivity of the match. This prevents a matched pair from writing a
complete enforceable contract at time t:1 and implies that ¯rms underinvest in training
since investment is held up.
At the beginning of t+1 the pair draws a match-speci¯c random productivity shock z:
Shocks are independently and identically distributed across matches with support [0;1)
and continuous cumulative density function G(z):
If the shock is favourable enough the pair bargains over a wage and produces in period
t + 1 a °ow of output zf(h) with f(:) strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfying
the Inada conditions. After one period of production the pair dies. To ensure stationarity
of the environment it is assumed that every worker that is employed at the beginning of
period t + 1 begets a son/daughter that will enter the labour market and start searching












Figure 1: Timing of events.
at the beginning of the next period. Normalizing the total labour force at the beginning
of each period to one implies that the °ow of new entrants into the labour force at the
beginning of the following period is
in
0 = 1 ¡ u (1)
If the shock is below a reservation level b the parties separate and start searching for
a new partner. The ¯rm has to pay a statutory severance payment4 equal to F in case
it ¯res the worker, but no payment is due if a worker quits. Clearly, our distinction is
meaningful only if third parties can distinguish between quits and layo®s.
We assume that outside parties can verify: a) whether a worker shows up for work;
b) if the ¯rm allows the worker on the premises; c) any written communication between
the two parties. A separation is deemed a dismissal if the ¯rm gives the worker written
notice that it no longer wishes to continue the employment relationship. The end of the
relationship is deemed a quit if the worker does not show up for work without providing a
written justi¯cation (e.g. a medical certi¯cate) or if the worker gives written notice that
she no longer intends to continue in employment. Until one of these actions is taken the
employment relationship is considered in existence. This seems broadly consistent with
existing practices in most developed countries.
Carmichael (1983) has argued that severance payments cannot be conditioned on
the identity of the party initiating separation: a ¯rm that wanted to dismiss a worker
could always induce her to quit by making her life di±cult and viceversa. In practice,
4As shown in Fella (1999), given e±cient bargaining, allowing for part of the cost born by the ¯rm to
be wasted would not a®ect the result.
7legislation often prescribes payments to employees in case of layo®, but workers are not
entitled to (and in general do not receive) any payment if they quit. So it has to be the
case that conditional severance payments are, if only imperfectly, enforceable. MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989) have shown that, if ¯rms but not third parties can observe e®ort,
workers' moral hazard problem can be solved by a wage contract with a performance-
related component. On the other hand, one would expect that, at least in the case of
collective workforce reductions, it is di±cult for an employer to convince a court that a
claim of constructive dismissal ¯led by a works council or a group of workers is unfounded.
Furthermore, if ¯rms could easily disguise layo®s as quits dismissal costs, and the whole
debate on their impact, would be irrelevant as ¯rms would never pay them.
The fact that a proportion of trained matched workers becomes unemployed implies
that the unemployment pool contains both skilled and unskilled workers. Since training is
general and search costly, it also implies the presence of positive spillovers as in Acemoglu
(1997).
For simplicity, I restrict attention to symmetric, steady-state, pure-strategy equilib-
ria. To ¯nd such an equilibrium, suppose that (given the matching and bargaining pro-
cess) the level of training of the representative skilled worker equals h¤: Then derive the
individually-optimal entry decision of a single unmatched ¯rm and the investment deci-
sion h of a single ¯rm, matched to an unskilled worker, with the total number of vacancies
v; unemployment stocks u and us and h¤ taken as given. In equilibrium h = h¤:
2.2 Flows and unemployment
The stock of unemployed workers at the beginning of each period evolves according to
u
0 = u[1 ¡ p(µ)(1 ¡ G(b))] + in
0: (2)
u0 equals the number of searching workers who were not matched in the previous period,
plus those who found employment but whose job was destroyed plus the °ow in0 of new
entrants into the labour force. Together with (1), equation (2) implies that steady state
unemployment is given by
u =
1
1 + p(µ)[1 ¡ G(b)]
: (3)
8Equation (3) is the Beveridge curve. A higher job ¯nding rate p(µ) and a lower rate of
destruction of unproductive matches G(b) decrease steady state unemployment.
Since all the workers who lose their job are trained, the stock of skilled unemployed
workers evolves according to
u
0
s = us [1 ¡ p(µ)] + up(µ)G(b): (4)
The mass of skilled unemployed workers u0
s equals the number of skilled workers who did
not leave unemployment in the previous period plus those workers (all trained) who were
matched but lost their job in the previous period. This implies a steady state proportion





For simplicity, we assume there are no unemployment bene¯ts and the utility of leisure is
zero. So U(h); the asset value of an unemployed worker with general human capital h at
the beginning of the period, is
[r + p(µ)]U(h) = p(µ)Ea(h); (6)
where Ea(h) is the value of accepting a match.
Our set up implies that all skilled workers have the same level of training. So, in the
symmetric equilibrium h = 0 if the worker is untrained and h = h¤ for a trained worker,
where h¤ is the optimal level of training for the representative ¯rm.
V; the value of a searching ¯rm, depends then on the expected level and incidence of
training among the unemployed population and satis¯es
[r + q(µ)]V = q(µ)[(1 ¡ G(b))Ja(0) + G(b)Ja(h
¤)]; (7)
where Ja(0) and Ja(h¤) are the values of accepting a match with an unskilled and trained
worker respectively. Conditional on having contacted a worker the probability that she
9is skilled is us=u = G(b): In equilibrium with free-entry the value V of posting a vacancy
equals ·; the investment cost.
2.4 Bargaining
Because of search frictions a match which is formed and/or is not destroyed yields quasi-
rents. We assume that the parties will bargain over the division of these quasi-rents
according to a variant of alternating o®er bargaining due to Binmore (1987).
At the beginning of each bargaining round, nature selects one of the two parties to
make an o®er, the worker being selected with probability ¯: The counterpart either accepts
the o®er, in which case production takes place and the game ends, or she rejects the
proposal and the game moves to a new round after a delay equal to ¢. When responding
to an o®er each party can also unilaterally and irreversibly abandon the negotiations to
trade outside (take her outside option, in the bargaining terminology), ending the game.
We assume the parties cannot search for another partner during bargaining5.
The solution to the general bargaining problem is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Be S the expected value of the total surplus from reaching an agreement
and E and J respectively the worker's and ¯rm's share of this surplus. Then:
a)
S = maxfC;U + ·g; (8)
where C is the expected value of the total surplus from continuation of the match;
b) the unique, subgame perfect equilibrium values of E and J satisfy
E =
8
> > > <
> > > :
¯S if U < ¯S < S + F ¡ ·
U if U > ¯S
S + F ¡ · if ¯S > S + F ¡ ·
(9)
5Relaxing this assumption would not alter the qualitative nature of our result. Masters (1998) allows
for search during bargaining in a similar set up. He shows that, unless the employment relationship is
mediated by an intermediary who pays the parties their marginal product, the underinvestment result
goes through.
10and
J = S ¡ E: (10)
Proof. a) With transferable utility, sharing the higher between the joint payo® from
separation and from continuation is Pareto optimal.
b) Binmore (1987) shows that in the absence of outside options the parties share the
joint payo® according to the relative bargaining power ¯. Binmore, Shaked and Sutton
(1987) prove that outside options bound bargained payo®s from below.
The ¯rst part of proposition 1 implies that the parties will bargain over the higher
between the joint payo® from continuation and the total return from separation. With
transferable utility, the separation decision is always e±cient in the sense that it maximizes
the total payo®, independently from the existence of legislated dismissal costs. This is
just one more instance of the Coase theorem.
Part b) states that the parties share the joint payo® according to the relative bargaining
power ¯ unless either party can do better by abandoning the match and searching for a
new one. In this latter case, the binding outside option determines the shares. If F > 0,
¯ring costs reduce the ¯rm's outside option and its payo® in those states in which its
market return would be binding in the frictionless equilibrium.
Firing costs drive a wedge between the return to the ¯rm's assets outside the relation-
ship in case the worker unilaterally abandons the match and the same return if the ¯rm
¯res the worker. This wedge increases the scope for bargaining not only over the surplus
from continuation, but also over the total payo® from separation. The ¯rm cannot severe
the relationship unless it pays the ¯ring cost or bargains with the worker over a voluntary
side-payment that induces him to quit. On the other hand, workers are free to quit at
any time.




¤) ¡ (h ¡ h
¤): (11)
The ex ante surplus from meeting a worker with human capital h is given by Se
p(h¤); the
expected ex post surplus from being matched with a trained worker at the beginning of
t+1; minus the cost of training the worker. The cost is obviously zero for a trained worker
11with initial human capital h¤:











¤) ¡ (1 ¡ G(b))(h + Ea(0)); (12)









¤) + ·]: (13)
The joint surplus coincides with the revenue from production if the match-speci¯c shock
is above the reservation productivity b and the total return from separation otherwise. In
case the match is severed the joint payo® is given by the value U(h¤) of being a trained
unemployed worker plus ·; the value of search to the ¯rm.
Given that all ¯rms are identical the worker's outside option cannot be binding at t:1,
as at best she will meet an identical ¯rm one period later.
Similarly, the ¯rm's outside option is not binding in case it is matched with a trained
worker. In the best possible case, it will meet a similar worker with a one-period delay.






Things are di®erent in case a ¯rm meets an unskilled worker. If the ¯rm turns the
worker down and searches for another match, with positive probability it will ¯nd a skilled
worker after one period and will not have to bear the training costs. So the ¯rm's share
of the total surplus is the higher between the return to going back to search · and a

















Equation (15) shows that, though the ¯rm invests in training non-cooperatively, an un-
trained worker shares the cost of the training that it is optimal for the ¯rm to provide
ex post. It needs to be pointed out that dismissal costs do not a®ect the ¯rm's outside
option at time t:1 since they are not due if a job applicant is turned down before starting
12employment.
Whatever the distribution of the ex post surplus at t + 1 side payments ensure that
the ex ante distribution satis¯es (14) and (15).
We can then use equations (6), (13) and (14) to solve for the reduced-form asset value


















































3 Investment and equilibrium
The ¯rm invests in training non-cooperatively after side-payments have been exchanged
and before uncertainty about the quality of the match is revealed. Optimality then
requires equality between the marginal investment cost and the expected marginal return







p(h¤) is the expected post-investment payo® to the ¯rm.





¤) + ·g: (20)
From proposition 1 we know that the parties bargain over zf(h¤) as long as continuation
is e±cient or z ¸ b; where the reservation productivity b satis¯es
bf(h
¤) = U(h
¤) + ·: (21)
13In general, ¯ determines the share of revenues that each party receives when revenues
are high, but either party's outside return may become binding for low values of z. The
following proposition establishes the conditions under which the ¯rm's or the worker's
market alternative is binding with positive probability.
Proposition 2 If (1 ¡ ¯)U(h¤) < ¯· in equilibrium, then for
F < · ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)bf(h
¤) (22)
there exists zr 2 [b;1) satisfying
F = · ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)zrf(h
¤) (23)
such that 8z · zr; Jp(z;h¤) = · ¡ F:




such that 8z · zr; Ep(z;h¤) = U(h¤):
Proof. See appendix A.
The condition (1 ¡ ¯)U(h¤) < ¯· implies that, when the match productivity is low,
the ¯rm's bilateral monopoly share of the highest between the surplus from production
and that from separation falls short of the ¯rm's payo® from ¯ring the worker and trading
outside. When the match productivity is low the ¯rm receives its outside option since the
threat to ¯re the worker is credible and is actually carried out when separation is e±cient.
Viceversa, if the inequality is reversed, it is the worker's market return that becomes
binding in bad states and independently from the size of ¯ring costs. When separation is
e±cient, the worker quits the ¯rm, since the share of the total payo® from separation he
would obtain by bargaining is lower than her outside option.
In general, there is no reason to expect one condition rather than the other to prevail.
In the presence of both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty one would expect the ¯rst
condition to prevail in recessions, when the value of being unemployed is low, and the
14reverse condition to prevail in booms, when market tightness and the expected surplus
from a match are high.
Given that ¯ring costs matter only in those states of nature in which the ¯rm's outside
option is binding in the laissez faire equilibrium, we will assume for simplicity in what
follows that the ¯rst condition always holds.
3.1 Equilibrium with small severance payments
Proposition 1 and 2 together imply that if ¯ring costs satisfy F < · ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)bf(h¤); the




¤) = (1 ¡ ¯)f(h)
Z 1
zr
zdG + G(zr)(· ¡ F): (25)
The ¯rm receives a share (1¡¯) of total revenue if the match productivity is high enough
and its outside option in all other states. The ¯rst-order condition for optimal investment
is then






With small or no severance payments the privately optimal level of training is independent
from external conditions. Since human capital is vested in the worker the ¯rm's payo®
when z < zr is independent from the level of training.
The level of investment is a decreasing function of zr; as the higher zr the higher the
probability that the ¯rm's outside return is binding. As equation (23) shows, severance
payments reduce zr: Hence they increase the range of states over which the ¯rm shares
the return from its investment and improve its incentives to train.
That breach remedies can improve the investor's incentives through the mechanism
highlighted here was ¯rst suggested by Hart and Moore (1988) and further exploited in
MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), Che and Chung (1996) and Che and Hausch (1999).
The only di®erence is that while in those articles breach penalties cannot be conditioned
on the identity of the party who refuses to trade, here severance payments are not due if
it is the worker that quits the ¯rm. The reason for this di®erence is twofold. First, this
paper focuses on the employment relationship rather than general bilateral relationships.
15In practice workers do not receive any payment if they quit. Second, when ¯rms invest
in general, rather than speci¯c, training it is not necessarily the case that imposing a
lump-sum transfer on the ¯rm if the worker quits improves the ¯rm's incentives to train.
For example, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) show that if ¯xed-wage contracts can be
written, ¯rms capture the full marginal return to training in those states in which the
contract is not renegotiated. Taxing ¯rms on quits would increase the probability that
workers capture part of the return and discourage investment6.
We can now characterize the equilibrium with zero or small severance payments. Using
equations (21) and (16) we can write the reduced form job destruction condition as
bf(h) = · +
p(µ)¯









De¯nition 3 A stationary symmetric equilibrium with zero or small dismissal costs is a
vector of allocations [µ;u;us;h¤;b;zr] and a value function Se
p(h¤) such that: (i) the free
entry condition (18) determines µ; (ii) Se
p(z;h¤) is given by equation (20), (iii) the two
°ow equilibrium equations (3) and (5) determine u and us, (iv) h¤ solves the ¯rst order
condition (26), and (v) zr and b satisfy equations (23) and (27).
For a given level of h, equilibrium can be represented graphically as the intersection of
the job destruction (JD) and a job creation (JC) condition as in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). Under the assumption that the ¯rm's outside option is not binding7 at t:1; one
can write one version of the job creation condition by using equation (21) to replace U(h¤)


















Figure 2 plots the two curves in the (µ;b) space. The JC locus is upward sloping8. The
JD curve - given by equation (27) - is upward sloping and convex, with a strictly positive
6On the other hand, in our model the worker's marginal return is lower outside than within the
relationship in those states in which the the worker's frictionless outside option is binding. Taxing ¯rms'
on quits would further increase incentives to invest.
7The case in which the outside option is binding is qualitatively similar.










Figure 2: E®ect of severance payments on equilibrium.
horizontal intercept at b = ·=f(h¤) and a vertical asymptote. Thus, provided JC lies
above JD at b = ·=f(h¤) - that is provided vacancy posting is positive when the value of
unemployment is zero - an equilibrium exists9.
The system is block recursive with equations (23) and (26) determining the level of
training. An increase in severance payments, results in higher training. This induces
¯rms to post more vacancies for given separation rate and to ¯re less for given market
tightness. Suppose the economy is initially in equilibrium at E: An increase in severance
payments then moves both the JD and the JC curves up. It can be easily shown that the
horizontal shift in the JC locus always exceeds the shift in the JD curve. Assuming that
the equilibrium is unique, severance payments unambiguously increase market tightness
and the job ¯nding rate p(µ), but have an ambiguous e®ect on the reservation productivity
b and the separation rate. In case the job destruction rate increases, the net e®ect on
equilibrium unemployment is ambiguous. Numerical simulations, though, indicate that
whichever the direction of the movement in unemployment incidence, the increase in
vacancy posting prevails and employment increases.
9It is not possible to prove that the equilibrium is unique, though numerical experimentation suggests
that this is the case.
173.2 Equilibrium with consensual layo®s
Small severance payments reduce the probability that the ¯rm's outside option is binding
when continuation is e±cient. Yet, they do not prevent employers from ¯ring the worker
when the match is no longer viable. So, the ¯rm does not capture any return to its
investment in case of separation.
Suppose instead that a ¯rm can severe the employment relationship only with the
worker's consent. This e®ectively locks the ¯rm in a bilateral monopoly situation. The
¯rm does not only have to share the surplus from production. When separation is e±cient
the ¯rm cannot unilaterally severe the relationship, though this would give it a larger share
of the total separation payo®. Instead, it has to bargain over the size of the payment that
induces the worker to agree on separation. The ¯rm's ex post payo® at time t+1 is then
Jp(z;h
¤) = (1 ¡ ¯)maxfzf(h
¤);U(h
¤) + ·g: (29)














the ¯rm would invest up to the point where












or, using equation (16)
1 = (1 ¡ ¯)
r + p(µ)







Confronting equations (31) and (26) it is evident that the obligation to severe the
employment relationship by mutual consent further increases investment for two reasons.
First, the ¯rm's outside option is never binding when production is e±cient: zr does
not enter the investment condition any more. Second, the ¯rm now captures a fraction
(1 ¡ ¯) of the marginal return to training outside the relationship. Consensual layo®
arrangements reduce the ¯rm's total return from separation, but by forcing employers to
18share the total outside payo® they increase their marginal return to training. This second
e®ect is the new insight of this paper. In so far as investment is general and vested in the
non-investing party on separation, institutions or contractual arrangements that result in
sharing of the total separation payo® improve incentives to invest.
Interestingly, institutions of the kind envisaged here do exist in practice. In Germany
¯rms cannot carry out collective redundancies unless they have secured the works council's
approval of a social plan detailing the conditions and terms of layo®s, including the size of
severance payments. The institution of lifetime employment in Japan and the voluntary
commitment to a zero-¯ring policy in certain ¯rms such as DEC, IBM, Eli Lilly and others
achieve the same result. Dismissals are still carried out but only on terms which meet
the workers' consent. Note that, provided ex ante side payments, are unconstrained our
model predicts that it is rational for ¯rms to adopt such policies.
In other countries such as Spain and Italy, high explicit or implicit ¯ring costs can
achieve the same result. In fact, it can be shown that
Corollary 4 If (1 ¡ ¯)U(h¤) < ¯· and F > · ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)bf(h¤) then the ¯rm's ex post
payo® is given by
Jp(z;h
¤) = (1 ¡ ¯)maxfzf(h
¤);U(h
¤) + ·g: (33)
Proof. See appendix A
Large enough severance payments achieve the same e®ect as a consensual layo® clause
by reducing the ¯rm payo® from ¯ring below the bilateral monopoly outcome. The ¯rm
is then better o® paying the worker a share of the total separation payo® to induce her
to quit rather than unilaterally severing the relationship.
We can now characterize the equilibrium with either large severance payments or
consensual layo® provisions.
De¯nition 5 A stationary symmetric equilibrium with consensual layo® is a vector of
allocations [µ;u;us;h¤;b] and value function Se
p(h¤) such that: (i) the free entry condition
(18) determines µ; (ii) Se
p(z;h¤) is given by equation (20), (iii) the two °ow equilibrium
equations (3) and (5) determine u and us, (iv) h¤ solves the ¯rst order condition (32),
and (v) b satis¯es equation (27).
19The equilibrium can still be represented by the job destruction and job creation loci in
¯gure 2, but the system is no longer recursive. The optimal level of investment in equation
(32) now depends on aggregate variables. Yet, one can prove that the equilibrium with
consensual layo® provisions features a higher training level than the one with small or no
severance payments.
We can use a continuity argument exploiting the equivalence between consensual lay-
o®s and large enough severance payments established in corollary 4. We know from the
previous subsection that in the equilibrium with small severance payments the optimal
level of training in equation (26) is independent from external conditions and increasing
in the size of dismissal costs. As the severance payment F increases, both zr and b change,
but their distance decreases. For F converging to its critical value ·¡(1¡¯)bf(h) from
below, zr converges to b: So, the integral on the right hand side of equation (26) is in-
¯nitesimally close to the ¯rst addendum in the bracket on the right hand side of (32). For
F equal or larger than its critical value the right hand side of (32) equals the right hand
side of (26) plus a strictly positive term in U0(h¤).
So, an equilibrium with consensual layo®s features, coeteris paribus, a higher training
level and job ¯nding rate while, as in the previous section, no unambiguous analytical
predictions can be made on the direction of the change in the separation and the unem-
ployment rates.
3.3 Empirical predictions and discussion
The model is too crude to allow for convincing calibration. Yet, its main insight revolves
around the internalization of the externality associated with human capital being vested
in the worker on separation. This aspect would survive in largely unchanged form in a
more realistic model .
It is then possible to work out the percentage change in the level of training stemming
from the introduction of consensual layo®s in an economy in which severance payments
are large enough to ensure that ¯rms' outside returns are never binding when continuation
is e±cient, but not so large as to induce consensual layo®s. When F is just below the














Table 1: Percentage increase in training level associated with consensual layo®s.
to b in equation (32). If we call h¤
L the optimal level of investment in the ¯rst case and
h¤










r + p(1 ¡ ¯G(b))
¶
: (34)
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function f(h) = h±; the percentage change in














The output elasticity ± can be recovered from empirical studies of the impact of train-
ing on wages. Under the assumption of rent sharing, the wage and revenues elasticity with
respect to training coincide. Parent (1999), using the US National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth estimates a wage semielasticity with respect to training equal to 0.12 which given
a mean level of training equal to one quarter gives an elasticity of 0.03. An elasticity of
0.02 can be obtained based on a similar study by Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999). We
chose an intermediate value of ± = 0:025 and set the real interest rate r to 0.04. The value
of the job ¯nding rate p is not particularly crucial. It is clear from the above equation
that, as long as p is relatively large with respect to r; it has little e®ect on the results.
We set p = 1 which is consistent with an average unemployment duration not exceeding
one year.
Table 1 presents the percentage change in the level of training associated with con-
sensual layo®s for di®erent values of the sharing parameter ¯ and the layo® rate G(b):
21The range for ¯ re°ects the empirically observed values for the share of labour income
in total product. Since there is no sharing in the case of quits both in reality and in our
model, the relevant separation rate to look for is the layo® probability rather than the
total job destruction rate rate. Blanchard and Portugal's (2000) comparative study of
job and worker °ows in Portugal and the US identi¯es the layo® rate with the rate of job
destruction. They estimate the annualized (quarterly) layo® rate for Portugal to 16% and
the same rate for the US to respectively 22% and 29% for the manufacturing sector and
all sectors respectively.
As the table shows, the gains are small in countries with low layo® rates, but can be
quite sizeable in countries in which ¯rm-initiated turnover is higher. This is no surprise,
as the extent of the externality is increasing in the rate of turnover. Also, the higher is
¯ the higher is the fraction of the spillover accruing to the worker on separation and the
larger the incentive that consensual layo®s provide.
The size of these e®ects suggests that the mechanism provided cannot be the main
explanation for cross-country and cross-culture variation in training levels10. Yet, it is by
no means negligible, at least in countries with higher layo® rates.
Some empirical support for this mechanism is provided by Bishop (1991) who ¯nds
that the likelihood and amount of formal training are higher at ¯rms where ¯ring a worker
is more di±cult.
The insight of this paper is not restricted to ¯rm-provided training. A number of
authors11 have conjectured that job security measures may increase workers' contribution
to ¯rms' value. The mechanism studied here applies equally to investment carried out by
employees which is vested in the ¯rm and general in nature. For example, the reputation
for high quality and reliability of German and Japanese cars is vested in the manufacturing
companies, but is largely dependent on their labour force e®ort. A programme developed
by a software engineer employed by a ¯rm is intellectual property of the employer. In all
these cases, consensual layo® arrangements allow workers to capture part of the return to
10For example, the studies surveyed in Bishop (1991) document large di®erences in the incidence and
duration of training between the US on the one hand and Germany and Japan on the other. Krafcik
(1990) ¯nds that newly hired assembly workers in the US receive an average of 48 hours of training in
US-owned plants and 280 in Japanese-managed ones.
11See, for example, Nickell (1998) and Bean (1997).
22their investment on separation.
Of course, a measure which redistributes ex post payo®s from ¯rms to workers must
reduce ¯rms' incentives along some other line. Provided side payments from workers to
¯rms are not required or constrained, consensual layo®s arrangement do not alter ex ante
bargaining power. So they have no direct e®ect on any investment carried out before
a match is formed12. On the other hand, consensual layo® provisions do reduce ¯rms'
incentives to reinvest in physical capital and other assets which may be general, but
whose return is now partly captured by the worker in case of separation.
Relaxing the assumption that there are no constraints on workers' entry fees, opens
the possibility that consensual layo® arrangements may reduce ¯rms' ex ante bargaining
power. This would result not only in lower vacancy posting, as in Garibaldi and Violante
(2000), but also in lower ex ante investment by ¯rms. It has to be noted, though, that
it is not obvious that side-payments from workers to ¯rms are required in equilibrium.
This depends not only on training costs, but also on whether it is workers' or ¯rms' ex
post bargaining power that exceeds its ex ante counterpart. In general this depends on
the probability that each party's outside option is binding ex post13.
Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that in the frictionless equilibrium ¯rms
rather than workers would like to unilaterally severe the relationship when productivity
is low. The insight of the paper, though, applies equally to quits. Measures to prevent
workers from quitting unless by mutual consent would further allow ¯rms to capture part
of the marginal return to their investment and improve incentives. We do not observe
institutions of this kind, though. One would expect them not only to con°ict with the
natural law tenet that human capital cannot be alienated, but also to run into di±culties
and possibly result in ine±cient employment continuation in so far as workers are unable
to buy out their jobs due to borrowing constraints. On the other hand, we do observe
similar institutions when ¯rms rather than workers are the non-investing party and natural
rights or borrowing constraints are less of an issue. For example, top managers' e®ort
12Though, they may have indirect e®ects if general training is a complement or substitute for other
forms of investment.
13For example, under our assumption that workers' outside returns are never binding, it is ¯rms that
should pay an entry fee to skilled workers unless consensual layo® measures ensure that ex ante and ex
post bargaining power coincide.
23is a typical example of general, worker-initiated investment which is vested in the ¯rm
of separation. It is quite common for companies to negotiate golden-handshakes when
top managers are removed. Given the publicity that these payments often receive, it
is conceivable that in these cases reputation consideration may support the mechanism
highlighted in this paper even in the absence of explicit contracts.
One point that this paper does not address is why ¯rms invest in general training in
the ¯rst place. Under realistic values for ¯ the level of training would be higher if workers,
rather than ¯rms, invested. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) have shown that simple ¯xed
wage contracts allow the ¯rm to capture the full marginal return to its investment with a
very high probability. In such a set up it would be e±cient for ¯rms to invest in training
provided that the probability that the workers' outside return is binding is low and the
insight highlighted in this model would still apply. Extending the paper in this direction
is a priority for future research.
4 E±ciency
It is well known that the decentralized equilibrium in a search environment without wage
posting is not e±cient unless the share parameter ¯ happens to satisfy some variant
of the Hosios (1990) e±ciency condition and balance the thick market and congestion
externalities. Apart from this special case, both job creation and job destruction are
ine±cient. This compounds the ine±ciency associated with the non-contractibility of
investment and discussed above. In such a second-best world consensual layo®s do not
necessarily increase the °ow of consumable resources At the decentralized allocation a
higher level of training boosts output net of training costs, but this may or not be o®set
by the increase in total search costs resulting from the increase in vacancy posting.
As it turns out, one cannot even conclude that starting from laissez-faire training
increases e±ciency conditional on ¯ satisfying the Hosios condition. In fact, independently
from hold up issues, the mere coexistence of skilled and unskilled workers introduces a form
of ine±ciency that is absent from search models with homogeneous workers. To better
highlight this ine±ciency, we will abstract from the investment decision in what follows
and show that, conditional on any positive level of investment, there is no value of the
24sharing parameter ¯ that can decentralize the social optimum. For ease of comparison we
will assume that the level of investment is fully e±cient in the decentralized economy of the
previous section and will compare the decentralized and socially optimal job destruction
and job creation decision14.
The utilitarian social planner chooses a time path for the control variables, the beginning-
of-period reservation productivity and market tightness pair (b;µ0); to maximize the
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s = us [1 ¡ p(µ)] + up(µ)G(b);
with A = f(h)
R 1
b zdG + G(b)·:
The social planner takes into account the evolution of the unemployment stock and
of the number of skilled unemployed workers, but takes the demographics in0 as given15.
Aggregate income is de¯ned as market output net of both investment costs and the op-
portunity cost r· of un¯lled vacancies. Investment costs comprise the cost of training
the number (u ¡ us)p(µ) of unskilled workers who ¯nd a match - the second addendum
in equation (36) - plus the cost of opening new vacancies - equal to · times the °ow of
new vacancies µ0u0 ¡ u(µ ¡ p(µ)). Note that µ; the lagged value of the control variable µ0;
enters the state space.
In what follows, rather than characterizing the social optimum for arbitrary initial
conditions, we solve for the steady state.
The ¯rst order necessary conditions for the socially optimal reservation productivity
14The condition for socially optimal investment is derived in appendix B.
15Since the demographics in our model just ensures stationarity of the environment, it seems natural
to assume that it cannot be controlled by the social planner.
25and tightness are respectively








= A ¡ (1 ¡ G(b))(h + Lu); (38)
where Lu and Lus are the stationary partial derivatives of the value function. The above
conditions are also su±cient for an optimum under our assumptions of strict concavity
and homogeneity of the matching function:
The ¯rst equation implies that separation is e±cient when revenues from production
fall below the value of physical capital · plus the social value of a trained unemployed
worker. The latter can be decomposed into the sum of the shadow price Lu of one more
unskilled unemployed worker in the unemployment pool plus the value Lus of replacing
one skilled for one unskilled worker, keeping the total size of the pool constant.
The second condition implies that the social cost of posting a vacancy, given by the
investment cost · plus the carryover cost - adjusted for the reduction in the duration of
unemployment - must equal the expected social return. The latter takes into account the
social opportunity cost Lu in case production takes place and the worker does not return
to the unemployment pool16.
By the envelope theorem and stationarity, the steady state social values of a skilled




















At constant total unemployment, the only bene¯t from one more skilled worker in the
pool is the saving of the cost h if the worker ¯nds a job.
16One may rightly note that it is a trained, not an untrained, worker that does not reenter the un-
employment pool. Yet, keeping aggregate unemployment constant the steady state number of skilled
unemployed is independent of market tightness as can be seen from equation (5).
26The social value Lu of one more (unskilled) unemployed worker, instead, is the ex-
pected °ow of output net of vacancy posting costs and of the cost of training her when
she is matched with a ¯rm for the ¯rst time.
It is useful to rewrite equation (38) by making use of the fact that p(µ) = µq(µ): If we











Equations (40) and (41) together can then be used to rewrite the shadow value of an








Let us write the private job creation condition in a form comparable to equation
(41). To this purpose let us de¯ne the di®erence between the asset value of a skilled and
unskilled matched worker as e = Ea(h¤) ¡ Ea(0): Using equations (6) and (12) privately







= A + G(b)U(h) ¡ (1 ¡ G(b))(h








Under our assumption that investment in the decentralized equilibrium is socially
optimal (h = h¤); we are now in a position to characterize the conditions for e±ciency of
the decentralized equilibrium conditional on a given level of training. In what follows, all
expression are evaluated at the social planner optimum. E±cient vacancy posting requires
the right hand sides of (41) and (43) to be equal, or










¤) ¡ (1 ¡ G(b))e: (44)
E±cient job destruction requires the private and social values of a skilled unemployed
worker to be the same or, comparing equations (21) and (37),
U(h
¤) = Lu + Lus: (45)
27One can use equations (16), (39) and (40) to rewrite (45) as






· = 0: (46)
It is easy to check that it is ª(0) > 0 and ª(1) < 0: Since ª(:) is continuous the mean
value theorem implies that (46) is satis¯ed for a value ¯¤ of the sharing parameter in
(0,1). Let us assume that ¯ takes exactly this value and derive the restrictions that this
imposes on the di®erential e. This requires solving the system formed by (39), (45) and








r + p(µ)(1 ¡ G(b))
r + p(µ)
h
¤ ¡ (1 ¡ G(b))e
¸
: (47)
Hence, the di®erential e has to ensure equality of (42) and (47). It can easily be checked
that this requires e = h¤:
With ¯ taking care of job destruction - i.e. aligning the social and private values of a
skilled worker - e±ciency requires untrained workers to pay for the full cost of the training.
This ensures that private and social values coincide for unskilled workers too. But, unless
¯ = 1;in the decentralized equilibrium unskilled workers pay for only a fraction of the
total training cost h, as can be seen from equation (15). Hence, the sharing parameter ¯
alone is not su±cient to ensure full e±ciency in this model. This would not be the case
if there were just one worker type.
With homogeneous agents all that is required to achieve e±ciency on both the job
creation and job destruction margins is that the sharing parameter ¯ satis¯es the Hosios
(1990) condition equating the private and social value of an unemployed worker. This
can be easily checked by considering the case in which there is no investment in training;
i.e. both h and Lus are zero and all workers are identical. Then, e = 0 is necessary and
su±cient to equate the value of Lu in equation (42) and (47). If the sharing parameter is
such as to ensure e±cient separation then also job creation is e±cient17.
The result that the Hosios condition is not su±cient to ensure e±ciency in models
17The only di®erence with the respect to Hosios (19900 is that the optimal value of the sharing pa-
rameter ¯ does not coincide with the elasticity of the probability of ¯lling a vacancy due to the di®erent
bargaining solution adopted.
28with heterogeneous agents is not new. Bertola and Caballero (1994) show that when ¯rms
with heterogeneous productivities can choose the rate of vacancy posting at a convex cost,
job creation at more productive units is ine±ciently low in the absence of ¯rm-speci¯c
subsidies. Davis (1995) extends their result to the case of heterogeneity on both sides of
the market. Shimer and Smith (2000) reach similar conclusions in a very general setting in
which heterogeneous agents look for a match with endogenous and possibly non-stationary
search e®ort. They show that e±ciency can only be achieved by subsidizing (taxing) the
search e®ort of agents who are more (less) productive than average. In all these papers,
the ine±ciency stems from the inability of the share parameter alone to provide the correct
investment or search incentives to heterogeneous agents.
Our set up not only trivially extends the above result to the case in which heterogeneity
is restricted to non-investing agents - workers in our case - but, more interestingly, sheds
light on the mechanism through which heterogeneity matters.
To this e®ect, consider the case in which h > 0 and there are both skilled and unskilled
workers in the unemployment pool. If the separation rate were exogenous, there would
be just one active margin - the job creation one. We show in appendix B that there exists
one value for the sharing parameter ¯ that again ensures full e±ciency. With workers'
facing no active economic decision, apart from participation, e±ciency only requires that
the private return to posting a vacancy coincides with its social counterpart.
This highlights the fact that heterogeneity is not su±cient to invalidate Hosios result.
In the present model there are two types of unemployed workers and two active margins -
job creation and job destruction - that a®ect matching opportunities for other searchers.
As our previous discussion has shown, either workers' heterogeneity or the existence of
more than one active margin alone would not do. It is heterogeneity across active mar-
gins18 that drives the ine±ciency of the decentralized outcome when the social planner
has only one instrument - the bargaining share parameter - at her disposal. In our model
a searching ¯rm can meet either a skilled or an unskilled worker, but all separations re-
lease a skilled unit of labour. Hence equality between the social and the private return to
vacancy posting does not imply e±cient reservation productivity and viceversa. Only if
18If training were fully speci¯c, heterogeneity across active margins would disappear and an appropriate
value for the share parameter would ensure e±ciency.
29social and private values coincide for both skilled and unskilled unemployed workers are
incentives correct on both the job creation and destruction margins.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analysed non-contractible ¯rms' investment in general human capital in a
model of frictional unemployment. General training increases workers' productivity with
other employers but is vested in the worker on separation. This depresses investment as
no return accrues to the ¯rm on separation. We have shown that consensual layo®s, by
obliging ¯rms to share the total payo® from separation, improve employers' incentives
to train. The mechanism applies to all forms of general investment that is vested in the
non-investing party. It applies equally to workers' investment to improve product quality
and develop new products that remain intellectual property of their employers.
We have also shown that, independently from underinvestment in training, the laissez-
faire equilibrium is always ine±cient for any given level of investment. The coexistence
of skilled and unskilled workers implies that the Hosios (1990) condition fails to ensure
equality between social and private values for both skilled and unskilled workers. Since
workers are heterogeneous along the job creation and the job destruction margins the
sharing parameter alone cannot ensure e±ciency.
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33Appendix A: Proofs of propositions
Proposition 2. If (1 ¡ ¯)U(h¤) < ¯·, then for
F < · ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)bf(h
¤) (48)
there exists zr 2 [b;1)
F = · ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)zrf(h
¤) (49)
such that 8z · zr; Jp(z;h¤) = · ¡ F:




such that 8z · zr; Ea(z;h¤) = U(h¤):
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, there is no zr 2 [b;1) such that either party's
outside option is binding. Then, by proposition 1, it has to be Jp(z;h¤) = (1 ¡ ¯)zf(h¤)





· = (1 ¡ ¯)bf(h
¤): (52)
But then (51) and (52) imply (1¡¯)U(h¤) = ¯· which contradicts either assumption.




¤) + · = bf(h
¤) (53)
or
· > (1 ¡ ¯)bf(h
¤): (54)
34Hence, by continuity there exists zr > b such that
· = (1 ¡ ¯)bf(h
¤) (55)
as long as F < · ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)bf(h¤):
Symmetrically, it can be shown that the reverse inequality (1 ¡ ¯)U(h¤) > ¯· implies
that it is the worker's outside option U(h¤) which is binding for some zr 2 [b;1): zr is
una®ected by severance payments in this case as the worker's outside option is not.
Corollary 3. If (1 ¡ ¯)U(h¤) < ¯· and F > · ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)bf(h¤) then the ¯rm's payo® a
time t:3 is given by
Jp(z;h
¤) = (1 ¡ ¯)maxfzf(h
¤);U(h
¤) + ·g: (56)
Proof. The inequality F > ·¡ (1¡ ¯)bf(h¤) implies that as long as z ¸ b the ¯rm's
is better of sharing the payo® from continuation rather than ¯ring the worker. So, zr
= 2 [b;1): Remembering that bf(h¤) = U(h¤) + ·; it also implies that when z < b; it is
optimal for the ¯rm to negotiate a voluntary severance payment that leaves the worker
a share ¯ of the total payo® from separation U(h¤) + · rather than paying the legislated
severance payment F: The inequality (1 ¡ ¯)U(h¤) < ¯· implies that the worker would
not leave voluntarily without such a payment.
35Appendix B.
Socially optimal training
Let us de¯ne by SU(h) the social value of a trained unemployed worker and by Se
E(h)
the expected social surplus associated with a matched skilled worker at time t:2: We can
write









zdG + G(b)(SU(h) + ·): (58)
Solving for Se









zdG + G(b)·: (59)










It is straightforward to see that investment is always ine±ciently low in the decentral-
ized equilibrium as the right hand side of (32) is always smaller than the right hand side
of (60) for any value of ¯:
E±ciency with exogenous separation rate











Under the assumption that the ¯rm's outside option is not binding when a matched with
an unskilled worker is formed, the worker bears a share ¯ of the training cost. So the
di®erent between the asset values of matched skilled and unskilled workers is e = ¯h¤.
The privately optimal job creation condition can be rewritten by replacing U(h¤) and e







= (1 ¡ ¯)
r + p(1 ¡ G(b))
r + p(1 ¡ ¯G(b))
A ¡ (1 ¡ G(b))(1 ¡ ¯)h: (62)
It is straightforward to verify that for ¯ increasing in the [0,1] interval, the right hand
side of equation (62) decreases monotonically from a value larger than the (positive) right
hand side of (61) to a negative value. The mean value theorem implies that there exists
¯ 2 (0;1) that equates the right hand sides of the two equations decentralizing e±cient
job creation.
It is tedious but straightforward to prove that the same result applies if the ¯rm's
outside option does bind when a match with an unskilled workers is formed.
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